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UNiFonRM COMMERCIAL CODE-AccOUNTS RECEIVABLE FINANCING:
SECURED PARTIEs' NEW DOUBTS UNDER THE "CASUAL AND ISOLATED"

TEsT-Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 88 Wn. 2d 406, 562 P.2d
248 (1977).

Didco, a private construction company, contracted with defendant
Evergreen State College to furnish dormitory rooms for $144,953.
Plaintiff Architectural Woods, a wood products wholesaler, sold Didco materials for the project. To finance the purchase, Didco assigned

plaintiff all its rights under its contract with defendant, who was notified in writing of the assignments and who was instructed to make payments directly to plaintiff. Several months later, the National Bank of
Commerce took a security interest in all of the accounts and contract
rights of Didco's successor in interest,' which included Didco's contract with defendant. Defendant had made several payments directly
to plaintiff in accordance with Didco's instructions, but for reasons
unknown made its final payment to Didco's successor in interest

rather than to plaintiff. 2 Didco's successor applied the payment it
received from defendant to satisfy its debt to the National Bank
of Commerce.
Plaintiff contended that the assignment from Didco entitled it to
the final payment, but defendant asserted that the bank had a prior in1. After Didco had assigned its contractual rights to plaintiff, a company named
Moduleader bought out Didco, including its contract with defendant. Brief of Appellant at 3-4, Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 88 Wn. 2d 406, 562 P.2d 248 (1977).
However, the distinction between Didco and Moduleader played no part in the court's
reasoning and thus, to avoid confusion, the reader should consider Didco and Didco's
successor as representing the same business.
2. The court noted that defendant did not explain why, with full knowledge of the
assignment, it paid Didco's successor rather than plaintiff. Architectural Woods, Inc. v.
State, 88 Wn. 2d 406, 408, 562 P.2d 248, 249 (1977).
3. Id. Defendant contended that it could use the bank's priority for its own defense:
[I] t is well settled that when payment is made by the debtor to the creditor who
no longer has the right to receive payment, the latter will hold the payment as
constructive trustee for the person entitled thereto.
*.. [T] he most that appellant could hope would be to serve and act as constructive trustees [sic] for NBC which is entitled to payment due to its timely
filing as required by the statute.
Brief of Respondent at 36, Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 88 Wn. 2d 406, 562 P.2d
248 (1977) (emphasis in original).
Defendant apparently was relying on plaintiff's inability to show damages to preclude recovery, but because the court held that the bank did not have priority, it was
unnecessary to consider this argument. Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 88 Wn. 2d
406, 409, 562 P.2d 248, 249 (1977).
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terest in the accounts and contract rights of Didco's successor. 3 Defendant's assertion was based on plaintiffs failure to file a financing
statement which, defendant claimed, was required by section 9-302
of Washington's Uniform Commercial Code.4 If plaintiffs security interest was not exempted from the Code's general filing requirement,
then the bank, which filed a financing statement, 5 would have a prior
claim. 6 Plaintiff contended that its assignment from Didco did not
need to be perfected by filing because it fell within section 9302(1)(e), 7 which exempts an assignment not constituting a "significant part" of the assignor's outstanding accounts and contract rights. 8
The Washington Supreme Court held, in Architectural Woods, Inc.
4. Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 88 Wn. 2d 406, 408, 562 P.2d 248, 249 (1977).
R.C.W. § 62A.9-302 requires filing of a financing statement for perfection of a security interest in all instances except those specifically enumerated in that section. WASH.
REV. CODE § 62A.9-302 (1976).
The 1962 version of the Uniform Commercial Code is in effect in Washington.
Variations between the 1962 and 1972 versions of a section will be noted if they are
relevant to the issue being discussed. Although several changes were made in § 9-302,
none related to accounts receivable financing. U.C.C. § 9-302 (1972 version).
5. Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 88 Wn. 2d 406, 408, 562 P.2d 248, 249
(1977).
6. The only exception to the general filing requirement of U.C.C. § 9-302, which
applies to accounts and contract rights, is § 9-302(I)(e). See H. & Val J. Rothschild,
Inc. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 242 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. 1976). Washington
adopted this subsection without change. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-302(1)(e) (1976),
quoted at note 7 infra. Plaintiff's security interest in Didco's contract with defendant
was not perfected by filing and thus was unperfected unless the § 9-302(1)(e) exemption applied. The bank's security interest was perfected by filing and would take priority over plaintiffs unperfected interest under R.C.W. § 62A.9-301(1). See 242 N.W.
2d at 847.
7. Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 88 Wn. 2d 406, 408, 562 P.2d 248, 249
(1977). The section states:
(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except
the following:
(e) an assignment of accounts or contract rights which does not alone or in
conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant
part of the outstanding accounts or contract rights of the assignor.
WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-302(l)(e) (1976).
8. For the purposes of this exemption, the distinction between accounts and contract rights is unimportant, 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 674 (1976) (editor's note); therefore,
any reference in this note solely to "accounts" or to "accounts receivable" should not be
interpreted differently from "accounts and contract rights."
In H. & Val J. Rothschild, Inc. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 242 N.W.2d 844
(Minn. 1976), the court found the distinction between accounts and contract rights to
be significant in determining the application of § 9-302(1)(e), id. at 847, but it is apparently the only court to have done so. Even in Minnesota, the distinction is no longer
tenable because the 1972 amendments of the Code, which were adopted by the Minnesota legislature subsequent to the Rothschild decision, eliminate the distinction. 19 UCC
Rep. Serv. 674 (1976) (editor's note).
9. 88 Wn. 2d 406, 562 P.2d 248 (1977).
10. The court agreed with plaintiff's contention that its security interest was auto-
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v. State,9 that the assignment fell within section 9-302(1)(e) and that
since plaintiffs security interest was thus automatically perfected, 10
the bank's interest was subordinate." In deciding that Didco's assignment to plaintiff fell within the section 9-302(1)(e) exemption from
filing, the court was required to construe the language of that subsection 12 and its accompanying official comment. 13 More particularly,
the court considered the appropriate test for determining whether the
assignment constituted a "significant part" of Didco's outstanding accounts and contract rights.' 4 This note will analyze the court's reasoning in adopting the "casual and isolated" test, compare opinions from
other courts construing the same subsection, and argue that the
court's reasons fail to support the result reached. Finally, it will propose a means of construing the exemption which is more consonant
with both the literal statutory language and Article 9's dominant policy of protecting innocent creditors against secret transfers of collat5
eral.1
I.

THREE POSSIBLE TESTS

The court recognized three different tests which have been employed to determine whether an assignment of accounts and contract
rights falls within the scope of section 9-302(1)(e). 16 These three tests
may be denominated the percentage test, the absolute amount test,
and the casual and isolated test.
Under the percentage test, if the disputed assignment, either alone
matically perfected at the time of the assignment. 88 Wn. 2d at 409, 562 P.2d at 249.
For a brief explanation of automatic perfection, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 23-5, 23-6 (1972).

11. R.C.W. § 62A.9-312(5) provides: "(5) . . . priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined as follows: . . . (b) in the
order of perfection unless both are perfected by filing ... ."
Although § 9-312(5) was changed in the 1972 version of the U.C.C., plaintiff's
security interest would still have priority.
12.

WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-302(l)(e) (1976), quoted at note 7 supra.

13. The comment, Official Comment 5, reads in pertinent part:
The purpose of the subsection (1)(e) exemptions is to save from ex post facto
invalidation casual or isolated assignments: some accounts receivable statutes have
been so broadly drafted that all assignments, whatever their character or purpose,
fall within their filing provisions. Under such statutes many assignments which no
one would think of filing may be subject to invalidation. The subsection (1)(e)
exemptions go to that type of assignment. Any person who regularly takes assignments of any debtor's accounts should file.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-302, Official Comment 5 (1966).
14. 88 Wn. 2d at 409, 562 P.2d at 249.
15. See note 34 infra.
16. 88 Wn. 2d at 409, 562 P.2d at 249.
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or together with previous assignments to the same assignee, constitutes a significant part or percentage of the assignor's total outstanding accounts and contract rights, the assignment does not fall
within the exemption and the assignee must file to perfect a security
interest in those rights. 17 The absolute amount test determines the significance of an assignment by its dollar amount without regard to the
percentage of the outstanding rights which it comprises. It is unclear,
however, that any court has employed this test. 18 The casual and isolated test relies on an examination of the circumstances surrounding
the assignment and on the assignee's financing experience. 19 An isolated assignment, made to a nonprofessional buyer of accounts, is
20
exempt from the filing requirements under this third test.
II.

THE COURT'S REASONS FOR ADOPTING THE
CASUAL AND ISOLATED TEST

In reversing the lower court's holding, 2 1 the supreme court set forth
several reasons for adopting the casual and isolated test. First, the
17. Id. Accord, Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l Corp., 406 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), aff'd, 540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1977); In re Consolidated Steel Corp., I I UCC
Rep. Serv. 408 (N.D. Fla. 1972); Standard Lumber Co. v. Chamber Frames, Inc., 317
F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Ark. 1970); General Lithographing Co. v. Sight & Sound Projectors, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 304, 196 S.E.2d 479 (1973); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 10, § 23-8.
18. In the case which the Washington Supreme Court cited in discussing the absolute amount test, the Georgia Supreme Court apparently considered the assignment's
proportional significance as well. Park Ave. Bank v. Bassford, 232 Ga. 216, 205 S.E.2d
861 (1974). The court in Bassford stated:
The trial court found, and the evidence clearly authorizes the finding, that the
assignment from the contractor to the bank did transfer a significant part of the
outstanding contract rights of the assignor. Therefore, the bank was required to
file a financing statement in order to perfect its security interest.
205 S.E.2d at 863.
No case has been found which relies solely on the dollar amount of the assignment,
and such a standard is not supported by the language of § 9-302(l)(e) or that of
Official Comment 5. As a result, the absolute amount standard will not be further
analyzed in this note.
19. 88 Wn. 2d at 409-11, 562 P.2d at 249-50. See also In re First Gen. Contractors, Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 762 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Abramson v. Printer's Bindery,
Inc., 440 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 10, §
23-8, at 808.
20. The court stressed that plaintiff's inexperience in obtaining assignments was an
important factor in determining the casual and isolated nature of the assignment. 88
Wn. 2d at 411. 562 P.2d at 250. See In re First Gen. Contractors, Inc., 12 UCC Rep.
Serv. 762, 763-64 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
21. The trial court had found that the assignments were casual and isolated but
had "relied on a literal reading of the statute and found that the amounts of the assignments constituted a significant portion of the assignor's accounts and contract
rights." 88 Wn. 2d at 411, 562 P.2d at 250. It thus found the exemption inapplicable.

514

Accounts Receivable Financing
court reasoned that an assignee would often be in a poor position to
know whether an assignment constituted a significant part of the assignor's outstanding accounts and contract rights because the assignor
might be hesitant to disclose this information. 22 Furthermore, the casual assignee would be unlikely, in the court's view, to have sufficient
motivation to determine the true status of the assignor's outstanding
rights.2 3 Thus, the assignee would not be certain whether a filing was
required under the percentage test. The court noted that even if the
assignee were able to determine the amount of the assignor's outstanding accounts and contract rights, the percentage test itself "will never
have any certainty as various courts find certain percentages to be sig24
nificant or not."
The court's second reason was derived from the widely accepted
position that the party asserting the "significant part" exemption carries the burden of proving its applicability. 25 The court expressed the
view that the casual and isolated nature of an assignment was "particularly susceptible of proof. '26 Third, the court relied on the espousal of
the casual and isolated test by certain leading Article 9 experts. 27 Finally, the court justified its subordination of the literal Code language
by reference to the general principle of statutory construction expressed in an earlier Washington case that a statute "is to be con28
strued in a manner consistent with the general purpose thereof."
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONS

None of these reasons, when analyzed in the light of the Code's
22.

Id. at 410, 562 P.2d at 250.

23.

Id.

24. Id. at 409, 562 P.2d at 249.
25. Id. at 410, 562 P.2d at 250. Accord, Consolidated Film Indus. v. United States,
547 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Uvesco, Inc., 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 957 (S.D. Fla.
1973); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Chick Norton Buick Co., 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 1389
(Okla. Ct. App. 1971); Chattanooga Brick & Tile, Inc. v. Agnew, 18 UCC Rep. Serv.
1063 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976); Craig v. Gudim, 488 P.2d 316 (Wyo. 1971). But see In
re Boughner, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 144 (W.D. Mich. 1970); Abramson v. Printer's Bindery, Inc., 440 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Ct. App. 1969).
26. 88 Wn. 2d at 410, 562 P.2d at 250.
27. Id. at 410, 562 P.2d at 249-50. The court cited 1 G. GILMORE, SECd'RITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 19.6 (1965), and Kripke & Felsenfeld, Secured
Transactions: A PracticalApproach to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
17 RuTGERS L. REV. 168, 189-90 (1962). But see note 39 and accompanying text infra

(Professor Kripke does not clearly espouse either test).
28. 88 Wn. 2d at 410, 562 P.2d at 250 (citing Wilson v. Lund, 74 Wn. 2d 945,
447 P.2d 718 (1968)).
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broad policies, adequately supports the court's adoption of the casual
and isolated test. The court implied that an assignee could be more
certain about the need to file under the casual and isolated test than
under the percentage test.2 9 An assignee's inability to discover the
amount of the assignor's outstanding accounts and contract rights undoubtedly would, under the percentage test, leave the assignee uncertain about the need to file. But the exemption was not intended to
guide the assignee's attempt to determine whether he or she must file.
On this, Official Comment 530 and the Article 9 authorities 3 1 concur.
Comment 5 specifies that the exemption is intended to prevent the
"ex post facto invalidation" of assignments which no one would think
of filing. Professor Gilmore, upon whom the court relied heavily,
described the exemption as a line of defense in bankruptcy and noted
that because of the inherent uncertainty of the exemption's application, assignees should routinely file. 32 Because the exemption was
intended to operate only after the fact to protect an assignment which
no one would think of filing, the court's concern for the casual assignee's lack of motivation to discover whether the exemption applies
33
is inappropriate.
The overriding purpose of Article 9's central filing provisions is the
34
protection of innocent creditors against secret transfers of collateral.
The Code reflects no corresponding emphasis on protecting secured
35
parties against uncertainty about filing requirements.
29. The court did not support its implicit conclusion that an assignee could be
more certain under the casual and isolated test. 88 Wn. 2d at 409, 562 P.2d at 249.
30. The language of R.C.W.A. § 62A.9-302, Official Comment 5, is identical to that
of U.C.C. § 9-302, Comment 5 (1962 version). For the relevant portion, see note 13
supra.
31.
E.g., I G. GILMORE, supra note 27, § 19.6.
32. Id.
33. But see In re Boughner, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 144 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (the court.
like the Washington Supreme Court, stressed the importance of defining the exemption
in a way which would allow assignees to predict confidently whether a filing was required).
34. U.C.C. § 9-103, Official Comment 2 (1962 version) reads in pertinent part:
"[T] he purpose of filing is to allow subsequent creditors of the debtor-assignor to determine the true status of his affairs ....
" In the 1972 version of the U.C.C., this
statement appears in Comment 5(a). U.C.C. § 9-103, Official Comment 5(a) (1972
version). In E. Turgeon Constr. Co. v. Elhatton Plumbing & Heating Co., 110 R.I.
303, 292 A.2d 230 (1972), the court stated: "The entire thrust of art. 9 is the protection of the innocent creditors from a secret transfer of substantial intangible assets
upon which they relied." 292 A.2d at 233-34. Accord, [1977] U.C.C. REPORTERDIGEST (Bender) § 9-106, at 2-1613 (1971).
35. At other places in the Code, the drafters, apparently hesitant to require universal filing, let a consignor's or a lessor's need to file turn upon uncertain factual determinations. As a result, consignors and lessors routinely file to eliminate their doubt.

516

Accounts Receivable Financing
As the court noted, the party claiming automatic perfection carries
the burden of proving that an assignment falls within the exemption.
The court suggested that the casual and isolated test was preferable
since the casual and isolated nature of an assignment was "particular36

ly susceptible of proof."

The proposition that an assignee can more easily prove an assignment casual and isolated than proportionally insignificant is somewhat speculative. As long as the assignor has maintained accurate
business records, the percentage represented by the assignment at issue should not be difficult to establish. Nevertheless, the court's position that the casual and isolated nature of an assignment is more easily established than its proportional insignificance finds some indirect
support in the case law. Several cases have been decided against the
party asserting the exemption because the record failed to show the
amount of the assignor's total outstanding accounts and contract
rights at the time of the assignment. 37 The possibility that one test
makes the exemption easier to establish, however, does not indicate
Uncertainty has tended to produce the same practical effect as an unexpected requirement to file and thus has effectuated the primary purpose of protecting subsequent
secured parties. Under R.C.W. § 62A.2-326(3)(b), whether a person delivering goods
to another on consignment must file a financing statement to perfect a security interest
in those goods may depend on whether the person receiving them "is generally known
by his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others." WASH. REV.
CODE § 62A.2-326(3)(b) (1976). In Comment 2, the drafters note that the consignor's uncertainty, together with a presumption favoring filing, advances the policies of
the Code: "Pursuant to the general policies of this Act which require good faith not
only between the parties to the sales contract, but as against interested third parties,
subsection (3) resolves all reasonable doubts as to the nature of the transaction in
favor of the general creditors of the buyer." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-326,

Official Comment 2 (1966).
A lessor's position under the Code is analogous. Article 9 applies to a lease only if
it is intended as security. However, as stated in R.C.W. § 62A.1-201(37), "Whether a
lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case." The uncertainty of this factual determination causes the cautious lessor to file routinely to avoid
the possibility of litigation.
36. 88 Wn. 2d at 410, 562 P.2d at 250.
37. See, e.g., Consolidated Film Indus. v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 1279 (D.
Utah 1975), rev'd, 547 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1977). In Consolidated Film, the assignor
corporation had dissolved, and evidence of its outstanding accounts and contract rights
was unobtainable; therefore the court considered the circumstances surrounding the
assignment. Finding the assignment casual and isolated, the court held that it was
automatically perfected. 403 F. Supp. at 1285. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that the lack of evidence about the assignor's accounts and contract rights was fatal to
the claim of the party asserting the exemption because he or she bore the burden of
proving the assignment was "not a significant part." 547 F.2d at 536. Accord, In re
Uvesco, Inc., 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 957 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Chattanooga Brick & Tile, Inc.
v. Agnew, 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 1063 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976); Craig v. Gudim, 488 P.2d
316 (Wyo. 1971).
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which of the two was intended by the Code draftsmen and the Washington legislature.
The court emphasized that the casual and isolated test accorded
with the views of Professor Gilmore and Professor Kripke, both acknowledged Article 9 experts. 38 Professor Kripke, however, did not
clearly advocate either test. He saw the exemption as a means of ensuring that the Code would apply only to commercial transactions. 39
In describing the exemption's application, however, he cited the Code
language, "a significant part of the outstanding accounts and contract
40
rights," and not the "casual and isolated" language of the Comment.
Even if Professor Kripke's position could be interpreted as advocating
the casual and isolated test, his concern for limiting the Code's application in the area of accounts receivable financing has not been wide41
ly followed by the courts.
Professor Gilmore also believed the scope of the Code's application
should be limited; he indicated that he had favored an earlier draft of
section 9-102(1)(b), which stated that Article 9 applied to "any
financing sale" of accounts rather than to "any sale," as was finally
adopted. 42 Professor Gilmore expressed the view that section 9302(1)(e) was appropriate because of the Code's broad coverage of
sales of accounts: "When the net is spread so wide, some strange fish
may be caught. '43 However, the concluding sentence of Gilmore's discussion of section 9-302(1)(e) reveals that his view of the exemption's
38. 88 Wn. 2d at 410, 562 P.2d at 250 (citing I G. GILMORE, supra note 27, § 19.6,
and Kripke & Felsenfeld, supra note 27, at 189-90).
39. Kripke & Felsenfeld, supra note 27, at 189-90.
40. Id. See note 13 supra.
41. See, e.g., In re Boughner, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 144 (W.D. Mich. 1970), in which the
district court noted that, in 1962, Professors Kripke and Felsenfeld believed that the
exemption's purpose was to restrict the filing requirement to "classical commercial
financing through assignments of accounts receivable." Id. at 150. The court went on
to observe: "Although the learned counsellors [sic] may have grasped the intent of
the drafters of the U.C.C., the Pennsylvania courts, which have been pioneers in construing the U.C.C., do not seem to have followed the above analysis." Id.
The narrow interpretation of Article 9's scope by some of the early writers spawned
an argument often asserted in conjunction with the assertion of the § 9-302(l)(e)
exemption-specifically, that an outright sale of accounts which is not intended as
security falls entirely outside the scope of Article 9, thus no filing is required. Spurlin
v. Sloan, 368 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. App. 1963); Lyon v. Ty-Wood Corp., 212 Pa. Super. Ct.
69, 239 A.2d 819 (1969). Plaintiff Architectural Woods advanced this argument. Brief
of Appellant at 8-9, Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 88 Wn. 2d 406, 562 P.2d 248
(1977). The court, however, did not consider it in its opinion; therefore it is beyond
the scope of this note.
42. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 27, § 10.5, at 309.
43. Id.§ 19.6, at 538.
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proper scope does not accord with the casual and isolated test as applied by the Washington Supreme Court:
However, there is surely nothing wicked about paragraph (e); it is
carefully drafted so that no assignee, engaged in a regular course of financing, will ever be tempted to rely on it in order to avoid a filing

which ought to be made; cases may well arise in which it will accomplish its beneficent purpose of protecting assignees who are both insig44

nificant and ignorant.

Gilmore's postion appears to require satisfaction of both the Code
language and the Comment's "casual and isolated" language. The casual and isolated test, as applied by the Washington Supreme Court,
ignores the Code's "significant part" language.
Other Code authorities have also adopted positions inconsistent
with the court's conclusion. Professors White and Summers favor the
percentage test as a potentially more reliable measure of the exemption's applicability. 45 Professor Coogan opposes the exemption alto46
gether as unnecessary and uncharacteristic of the Code as a whole.
Presumably, he would favor a much narrower reading than that given
47
by the court.
The court's final rationale for adopting the casual and isolated test,
even though the test does not comply with the literal language of the
Code, was the axiom of statutory construction that "a statute is to be
'48
construed in a manner consistent with the general purpose thereof.
The court acknowledged that its holding emphasized the Comment
44.
45.
46.

Id. (emphasis added).
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 23-8, at 809.

1 P.

COOGAN, W. HOGAN, &

D. VAGTS, SECURED

TRANSACTIONS UNDER

U.C.C.

§ 10.03 [8], at 1087 (rev. ed. 1977). Washington had no such exemption before the
legislature adopted the Code in 1965. The comparable statute read:
No assignment of an account shall be valid as against present or future creditors
of the assignor... unless there shall be on file in the office of the filing officer,
at the time of the making of such assignment or within ten days thereafter, an
effective and uncancelled notice signed by the assignor and the assignee ....
Act ofJan. 15, 1947, ch. 8, § 3, 1947 Wash. Laws 20.
47. Professor Coogan stated:
The language used, however, is surely not calculated to excuse from compliance
with the notice-filing requirement an assignment to a bank of a single large
claim simply because it is an isolated assignment. The key to the role of the exception is the content assigned to the expression, "significant part of the outstanding accounts or contract rights."
IP. COOGAN, W. HOGAN, & D. VAGTs,supranote 46.
48. 88 Wn. 2d at 410, 562 P.2d at 250 (citing Wilson v. Lund, 74 Wn. 2d 945,
447 P.2d 718 (1968)).
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language over that of the statute itself, 49 but seemed to conclude that
Official Comment 5 more accurately expressed the general purpose of
the exemption. 50 However, the court's statutory construction rationale
establishes only that the casual and isolated test is a possible construction of the exemption. 5 1 The court made no effort to support its apparent assumption that Comment 5, rather than the statutory language itself, correctly expresses the exemption's purpose.
The source of the error in the court's reasoning was its initial
assumption that its choice lay between two distinct tests. In early
cases from other jurisdictions construing section 9-302(1)(e), the
courts' analyses lacked clarity. These courts often considered preCode law or misread the Code or Comment language. 5 2 Their occasional emphasis on the Comment language was in response to the
facts of particular cases. 53 The different foci that emerged were later
49. The court observed: "While the casual and isolated test does not follow the
literal language of the statute, it does meet the purpose stated in the official comment." Id. at 410, 562 P.2d at 250.
50. It is interesting to note that the court's attention was not drawn to the Washington Comments on the exemption nor to Official Comment 5. The Washington
Comment reads in pertinent part: "Part (e) exempts casual assignments and in practical operation should mean that filing is necessary only in commercial financing."
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-302, Washington Comment 1 (1966). This comment
supports the exclusive casual and isolated test more directly than does Official Comment 5. It was published by the Uniform Law Commission of the State of Washington
after the legislature adopted the Code in an attempt to explain "the impact on Washington law of the enactment of the Washington Uniform Commercial Code." 62-62A
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. at VII (1966) (foreword to Title 62A).
51. In a recent Tenth Circuit opinion, not presented to the Washington court in
either the appellant's or the respondent's brief, the court of appeals took the position
that any test which ignored the comparison of an assignment with the outstanding
accounts and contract rights was inconsistent with the unambiguous language of the
Code. Consolidated Film Indus. v. United States, 547 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1977). For
further discussion of this case, see text accompanying note 63 infra.
52. A Florida federal district court followed pre-Code precedent and held that an
assignment fell within § 9-302(1)(e) despite its proportional significance. The court
held that the casual and isolated nature of the assignment was dispositive but conceded that its position required "reading between the lines of the statute." In re First
Gen. Contractors, Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 762, 764 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
In In re Boughner, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 144 (W.D. Mich. 1970), the court emphasized
the business status of the assignor but ignored that of the assignee. Official Comment
5 indicates the importance of the assignee's experience in accounts receivable financing
but makes no reference to the assignor's experience.
In Standard Lumber Co. v. Chamber Frames, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Ark.
1970), the court concluded that because the assignment, when added to the amount of
the competing tax lien, was less than the outstanding accounts and contract rights, the
assignment was not a significant part. The exemption concerns an assignment to a
given assignee not in conjunction with competing security interests of other creditors
but in conjunction with other assignments by the same assignor.
53. See, e.g., Abramson v. Printer's Bindery, Inc., 440 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Ct. App.
1969). An assignee was persuaded to buy accounts receivable by his accountant, who
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labelled the percentage test and the casual and isolated test.5 4 As is of55
ten the case, the labels began to replace the underlying reasoning.
When viewed from a two-test perspective, the cases construing the exemption are hopelessly confused, with many cases mixing elements of
56
each test in the same analysis.
If section 9-302(l)(e) and Comment 5 are read as unconnected
standards, they conflict irreconcilably. If read together, however, as
Professor Gilmore seems to suggest, 57 they are consistent with both
the Code's policy against secret transfers 58 and the weight of judicial5 9
60
and scholarly authority.

also had an interest in the assignor's business. Because of the unusual factual situation,
the court focused its discussion on the nonprofessional status of the assignee. Id. at
328. The Washington Supreme Court cited Abramson as supporting the casual and
isolated test. 88 Wn. 2d at 409, 562 P.2d at 249. The holding in Abramson, however,
was based on bankruptcy law, and the court's discussion of the casual and isolated
test was entirely dictum.
54. Although not employing any specific labels, White and Summers identified what
they perceived to be "two somewhat inconsistent tests for determining whether a given
set of accounts is a 'significant part.' "J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 23-8,
at 807.
55. See generally Powers, Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52 WASH. L. REv. 27 (1976).
56. In the following cases, the courts considered elements from both tests: In re
Munro Builders, Inc., 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 739 (W.D. Mich. 1976); City of Vermillion,
S.D. v. Stan Houston Equip. Co., 341 F. Supp. 707 (D.S.D. 1972); H. & Val J. Rothschild, Inc. v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 242 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1976); E. Turgeon
Constr. Co. v. Elhatton Plumbing & Heating Co., 110 R.I. 303, 292 A.2d 230 (1972);
Sherberne Corp. v. Carter, 133 Vt. 411, 340 A.2d 82 (1975). See Consolidated
Film Indus. v. United States, 403 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Utah 1975), rev'd, 547 F.2d 533
(10th Cir. 1977), discussed at note 37 supra.
57. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 27, § 19.6, at 538.
58. See note 34 supra.
59. Several courts, after concluding that the proportion of the accounts assigned
was significant, have found the exemption inapplicable without any discussion of the
casual and isolated nature of the assignment. Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l Corp.,
406 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1977); General
Lithographing Co. v. Sight & Sound Projectors, Inc., 128 Ga. App. 304, 196 S.E.2d
479 (1973); Chattanooga Brick & Tile, Inc. v. Agnew, 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 1063 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1976). These cases could be read either as espousing the percentage test or
as according with the Tenth Circuit's refusal to consider the circumstances surrounding the assignment unless it is shown to be proportionally insignificant. See note 37 supra and notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text infra.
Only two cases have been found which allowed the exemption solely on a finding of
proportional insignificance. In re Consolidated Steel Corp., 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 408
(N.D. Fla. 1972); Standard Lumber Co. v. Chamber Frames, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 837
(E.D. Ark. 1970). Only one case allowed the exemption solely on a finding that the assignment was casual and isolated. In re First Gen. Contractors, Inc., 12 UCC Rep.
Serv. 762 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
60. See, e.g., I G. GILMORE, supra note 27, § 19.6, at 538 (an assignee must be
"both insignificant and ignorant" to invoke the exemption).
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PROPOSED TEST

Section 9-302(1)(e) should be construed as a single exemption with
a single two-tiered test. To apply the proposed test, the court would
first apply the percentage test 6 ' to determine whether the assignment
repesented a significant proportion of the assignor's accounts according to the literal statutory language. If, at this first stage of analysis,
the court found the assignment to be significant,62 the exemption
would not apply regardless of the circumstances surrounding the
assignment. Only if the court found the assignment proportionally insignificant would the factors set out in the Comment concerning the
assignee's inexperience and the casual and isolated nature of the assignment be considered. This second stage of analysis would function as a
further narrowing of the exemption. Thus, to be automatically perfected under the proposed test, the assignment would have to be insignificant and casual and isolated.
The Tenth Circuit adopted this integrated view in reversing a Utah
federal district court's finding in Consolidated Film Industries v.
United States.63 In the absence of any evidence establishing the
amount of the assignor's outstanding accounts and contract rights, the
district court considered the casual and isolated nature of the assignment and held that the exemption applied. 64 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that unless the party asserting the exemption could
carry the burden of proving the insignificance of the assignment, no
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the assignment, i.e., its
casual and isolated nature, was appropriate. 65 In other words, the
Tenth Circuit relegated the factors set out in Comment 5 to a subsidiary role and adopted an analysis consistent with the proposed
two-tiered test.
When the assignee is a nonprofessional, application of the casual
and isolated test, as adopted by the Washington Supreme Court,
could produce startling results. A court could find an assignment of
almost all of an assignor's outstanding accounts and contract rights to
61. See text accompanying note 17 supra for a definition of the percentage test
and note 17 itself for cases in other jurisdictions which have applied it.
62. As the court suggested, the numerical value which has been found to constitute
a significant percentage has varied in different jurisdictions. 88 Wn. 2d at 409, 562
P.2d at 249. As White and Summers noted, however, a reliable standard is likely to
emerge eventually. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 23-8, at 809.
63. 547 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1977), rev'g 403 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Utah 1975).
64. 403 F. Supp. at 1285.
65. 547 F.2d at 536.
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be exempt from the Article 9 filing requirements. 6 6 Moreover, under
the court's test, a prospective creditor cannot determine whether a
third party has an automatically perfected security interest in a substantial portion of a prospective assignor's accounts. If the uncertainty
of possible automatic perfection of a prior security interest in accounts receivable produces the same effect as have similar uncertainties in the area of farm equipment, 67 accounts receivable may become
less valuable as collateral.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Washington Supreme Court, in applying exclusively the casual
and isolated test, has adopted a minority position 68 which ignores the
literal Code language and infuses an unnecessary degree of
uncertainty into accounts receivable financing. The casual and isolated test is inconsistent with the Code's policy of protecting creditors
from secret transfers of collateral, and, in adopting it, the court may
inadvertently have discouraged creditors from engaging in a type of
financing which has gained respectability and widespread use in re69
cent decades.
Norman B. Page
66. In Architectural Woods, the unusual circumstances from which plaintiff's assertion of the exemption arose may have made the court's holding equitable. Defendant Evergreen State College did not know of the bank's security interest at the
time of its final payment to Didco's successor in interest. Brief of Appellant at 13,
Architectural Woods, Inc. v. State, 88 Wn. 2d 406, 562 P.2d 248 (1977). Under the
contract assignment principles argued by plaintiff, and not reached by the court, defendant's payment to Didco's successor was apparently unjustified. Id. at 26.
The unusual circumstances may have obscured the broad policies underlying the
exemption. Defendant was the account debtor and not a competing creditor as would
normally be the case. Had the action been between plaintiff and the bank, the impact
of the court's adoption of the casual and isolated test would have been clearer. Under
the casual and isolated test, Dideo could have assigned all of its accounts and contract
rights to plaintiff, which, as a nonprofessional financer, would obtain an automatically
perfected security interest. The bank, as a subsequent creditor, would have had no way
of knowing of the plaintiffs security interest. Except where an assignor has made many
proportionally insignificant assignments to different assignees, the percentage test
would afford the subsequent secured party greater certainty that most of the assignors accounts and contract rights were unencumbered.
67. The 1962 version of U.C.C. § -9-302(1)(c) reads: "(1) A financing statement
must be filed to perfect all security interests except the following... (c) a purchase
money security interest in farm equipment having a purchase price not in excess of
$2500...
This exemption was deleted by the 1972 amendments because the possibility of an automatically perfected security interest in farm equipment had the practical effect of reducing farm equipment's value as collateral. U.C.C. § 9-302, Reasons
for 1972 Change (1972 version).
68. See note 59 supra.
69. 1 G. GILMORE, supranote 27, § 8.1, at 251.
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